Family Law in Practice and Theory by Wardle, Lynn D.
Book Review
Family Law in Practice and Theory
AMERICAN FAMILY LAW IN TRANSITION. By Walter 0. Weyrauch* and
Sanford N. Katz. t Washington, D.C.: The Bureau of National Affairs,
Inc. 1983. Pp. xix, 629. $35.00.
Reviewed by
LYNN D. WARDLE t
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recently published and widely discussed symposium on law school curric-
ula, several distinguished law professors concluded that "legal education has been
unwisely dominated for too long by the study of doctrine and rule-manipulation,
[and] there must be greater emphasis upon both the broader theoretical underpinning
of law and legal systems and the practical role and tasks of the lawyer .... ,,1 One of
the writers, Roger Cramton, specifically recommended:
The basic [law school] curriculum should include more departures from this middle
road, both in the direction of the high road of legal theory (what is the nature of law? what
are the limits on its efficacy? what do we mean by justice and its fulfillment in the real
world?) and in terms of putting doctrine to work in solving customary legal tasks. This
shift would also give greater emphasis to planning and preventive law activities of lawyer-
ing, as distinct from after-the-fact litigation which is now the almost exclusive focus of
law school.
2
Professors Walter 0. Weyrauch and Sanford N. Katz share these views and have
written a book in an attempt to solve part of the problem. The unmistakable premise
of their book, American Family Law in Transition,3 is that the most important facet
of the practice of family law is the impact that family relationships and changes in
family relationships have upon the economic interests of family members. Professors
Weyrauch and Katz are not alone in believing that the practical aspects of family law
* Professor of Law, Spessard L. Holland Law Center, University of Florida. Dr. Jur., University of Frankfurt
Main, Germany 1951; LL.B., Georgetown University 1955; LL.M., Harvard University 1956.
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tt Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. B.A., Brigham Young University
1971; J.D., Duke University School of Law 1974.
I. Gorman, Legal Education at the End of the Century: An Introduction, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 315, 319 (1982)
(emphasis in original); see also Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left?. 32 J. LEGAL EDUc. 336
(1982); Michelman, The Parts and the Whole: Non-Euclidean Curricular Geometry, 32 J. LEGAL EDuc. 352 (1982).
2. Cramton, The Current State of the Law Curriculum, 32 J. LEGAL EDUC. 321, 331 (1982).
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have been neglected in the teaching of family law. This oversight may be due, in part,
to the traditional focus of family law casebooks on the ever changing doctrines or
rules of law, complemented by some discussion of the policies behind the rules, and
the corresponding lack of emphasis on how the law is applied by practicing lawyers
and trial courts or the effects of its application on the lives of family members in
specific cases. Now, Weyrauch and Katz have written a family law casebook entirely
from the perspective of the family law practitioner, with specific emphasis on the
business and property aspects of family law.
II. REVIEW OF CONTENTS
American Family Law in Transition is a casebook designed for use in in-
troductory family law courses. It consists of judicial opinions or excerpts (116 cases)
plus the authors' comments (60 comments, including the chapter introductions,
which average 2-3 pages each) arranged in five chapters. In the Preface, the practical
orientation of the book is clearly identified: "The emphasis of this book is on practice,
creating a perspective for those confronted with family law problems, including
aspects of planning, counseling, and trial strategy.",
4
A. Marriage and Contracts
Weyrauch and Katz introduce their business/property view of marriage im-
mediately. Chapter One, entitled "Marriage as Contract or Partnership (Co-
Ownership) for Profit," begins with a discussion of "party autonomy" in marriage
(i.e., relationships defined by antenuptial contracts and other similar agreements).
The authors underscore the advantages of premarital contracts "to safeguard delibera-
tion" before marriage. 5 Next, the question of whether marriage should be considered
a matter of status or contract is discussed. The authors favor the contract view, but
note that "legal practice can live with and accommodate apparent contradictions with
ease."6 Last, the economic consequences of looking upon marriage as a partnership
or business arrangement, with equal rights to enjoy income and property, and with
equal liabilities for debts and obligations, are considered. The authors state and
demonstrate that "ordinary business law practice can require a full mastery of family
law.
,,7
While Chapter One initially seems unbalanced because of the exclusive focus on
a contractual, business-oriented conception of marriage, the cases clearly demon-
strate that the economic consequences of marriage can be as significant as those
resulting from ordinary commercial enterprises. Hence, it is prudent for lawyers and
their clients to give as much deliberation to marriage before proceeding with that step
as they do to commercial partnerships or investments before making those com-
mitments. Of course, in light of the frequency of litigation over antenuptial contracts
4. Id. at vii.
5. Id. at 43.
6. Id. at 59; see also weyrauch, Metamorphoses of Marriage, 13 FAM. L.Q. 415 (1980).
7. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KArz, supra note 3, at 79.
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upon death or divorce, it would be unrealistic to expect such agreements to prevent all
litigation. Nevertheless, careful premarital deliberation and discussion between pro-
spective spouses of their individual expectations concerning marriage would set a
healthy pattern that might avoid-or facilitate the resolution of-problems during the
marriage, as well as after death or dissolution.
One characteristic that makes Chapter One and the entire book especially in-
teresting is the revelation of information about the cases and the parties that was not
discussed in the court opinions. For instance, following the opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in Maynard v. Hill,8 the authors reveal the following informa-
tion, which sheds a fascinating light on the decision of the Court:
David S. Maynard was a powerful figure in American history. Initially trained as a doctor,
he founded a medical school in Ohio and later, after his move across the country, became
one of the founders of the State of Washington and the city of Seattle. The same legisla-
ture of the Territory of Oregon, having jurisdiction over what later was to become the
State of Washington, granted Maynard his divorce from his first wife, created King
County upon his suggestion, declared him to be notary for King County, and established a
county seat on his land claim. Obviously he was a man who could demand and receive
almost anything from the legislature.
9
Providing such detailed historical context emphasizes the authors' point that often
practical factors had a more profound effect on decisions in landmark cases than the
doctrinal points for which the decisions have come to stand. 10
B. Quasi-Marital Relationships
Chapter Two, entitled "Informal Marriage," focuses on the abundance of differ-
ent legal doctrines that permit unmarried cohabitants to obtain economic shares
similar to those they would have been able to obtain had they been married. This
chapter includes cases illustrating doctrines such as putative marriage, marriage by
estoppel, partnership, joint venture, express trust, resulting trust, constructive trust,
express contract, and implied contract. The cases concern disputes arising at or after
the termination of a relationship that one or both of the parties thought was a valid
marriage or in which the parties occupied a quasi-marital relationship with each
other. Under these circumstances, the economic interests are often the predominant
aspect of the relationship. Therefore, it is valuable for law students to realize that the
legal theories and doctrines they have learned in courses on property law, business
law, partnership law, agency law, and remedies may be applicable.
The treatment of the well-known palimony dispute between Lee Marvin and
Michelle Triola Marvin is superb. Weyrauch and Katz set forth the opinion of the
California Supreme Court, in which the right of unmarried cohabitants to recover
8. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
9. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KA-z, supra nole 3, at 59-60. For other examples of similarly intriguing historical
information, see id. at 44, 60.
10. Id. at 59. This approach underscores Professor Weyrauch's previously expressed criticism of depersonalizing or
"masking" the humanity of the participants in legal processes. See Weymuch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual andRelevance,
66 CAUF. L. Rv. 699 (1978).
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from each other upon theories of express and implied contract, partnership, joint
venture, quantum meruit, and other equitable theories is recognized. 1 The authors go
further, however, and include the exhaustively detailed subsequent opinion of the
trial court, which granted rehabilitative quasi-alimony,' 2 and the even later opinion of
the California Court of Appeals, which overturned the trial court's award as being
outside of the issues of the case as framed by the pleadings and unsupported by any
recognized equitable doctrine. 13 The attention given the subsequent Marvin decisions
is consistent With the authors' emphasis on the practical side of family law and their
desire to bring major family law doctrinal decisions into perspective by exposing their
context and practical consequences. Moreover, the comment on the Marvin cases,
which emphasizes implications for legal practice, is especially thoughtful.
14
The authors' treatment of the putative spouse doctrine, however, may be in-
adequate. Weyrach and Katz include only one putative spouse case in Chapter Two, a
choice that may be criticized on two grounds. First, the putative spouse doctrine is
not limited to community property jurisdictions; the same or similar doctrines,
labeled differently, have been applied in most common-law jurisdictions. 15 Second,
the case the authors include, Sousa v. Freitas,16 does not represent the only, the
prevailing, or even necessarily the best approach to determining the property share of
a putative spouse.17
C. Marriage and Equality
Chapter Three, entitled "Equality in Marriage," addresses an eclectic collection
of topics. This chapter includes cases dealing with what the authors call the "incidents
of equality" such as a married woman's option of not assuming the name of her
husband, the child rearing rights of fathers, alimony for men, and the right of married
women to recover for loss of consortium. The authors commendably call attention to
a neglected area of the law by including a case dealing with the propriety of a judge's
wife running for a political office 18 and a formal opinion of the American Bar
Asociation ethics committee concerning the propriety of lawyers who are husband
and-wife representing clients with adverse interests. 19 These cases and the authors'
conments focus on the intriguing subject of the potential for marriage to restrict the
right of a married person to engage in professional or political activity because of the
spouse's employment.2 0
11. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
12. Marvin v. Marvin, 5 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3077 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1979), rev'd, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (1981).
13. Marvin v. Marvin, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal. Rptr. 555 (1981).
14. See W. WEYRAuCH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 204, 205.
15. See L. Wardle, C. Blakesley & J. Parker, Family Laws in the United States § 34:01-:02 (Oct. 1983) (un-
published manuscript in press).
16. 10 Cal. App. 3d 660, 89 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1970).
17. See generally W. RE'tY & C. SAMuEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 337-40 (2d ed. 1982).
18. In re Gaulkin, 69 N.J. 185, 351 A.2d 740 (1976).
19. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 340 (1975).
20. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KA-rz, supra note 3, at 261-68.
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Three Supreme Court decisions dealing with contraception and abortion are also
included in Chapter Three.2 1 The abortion cases raise very profound but awkward
questions for serious family law scholars. The issues are profound because they touch
the very core of family law concerns: does the family include unborn children; is a
child not a child because it is unborn; is abortion a form of child abuse; does the
principle of parental autonomy justify the practice of abortion; does a principled
distinction separate the abortion doctrine from doctrines that are protective of chil-
dren; and do any elements distinguish the abortion decision from other procreative
decisions in which the interests of parents and spouses are preserved? The awkward-
ness results from the popularity of the abortion rulings among lawyers; one does not
ask embarassing questions about justifications for practices that one's colleagues
enthusiastically support.
Although Weyrauch and Katz evidently are troubled by questions like those
listed above concerning the Supreme Court abortion decisions, they try to avoid the
policy debate and focus on the practical implications of the rulings.2 2 The authors'
practical perspectives about the abortion doctrine are valuable, but their con-
ceptualization of those cases as establishing principles of "equality in marriage" is
severely strained. It is difficult to see how a doctrine that gives a wife the unilateral
right to decide to destroy the life of a jointly conceived child in utero contributes to
equality in marriage. Equality connotes mutuality, not exclusivity, and it hardly
seems necessary to exclude the father of the unborn child from the abortion de-
cisionmaking process merely to protect "the female partner in marriage in her equal
role." 23
Nevertheless, the authors cannot be faulted too severely for this misconception
since the Supreme Court, which created the abortion doctrine, has been unable to
articulate a principled conceptualization of the abortion cases. 24 The problem, simply
stated, is that the abortion decisions are sui generis. The Justices themselves have
distinguished the abortion decisions from other decisions concerning family lifeY.2
Family law scholars should candidly admit that the abortion decisions are out of
harmony with prevailing general principles in family law rather than wrench, twist,
21. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See W. WEYRAucH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at 235-53.
22. In their effort to avoid the contemporary social and legal policy controversy, the authors have unfortunately
given an unnecessarily broad reading of the contraception and abortion cases. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KAtz, supra note
3, at 226, 300. See generally L. WARDLE, THE ABORTtON PRIVACY DOCTRINE 303-11 (1981).
23. Id. at 226.
24. Archibald Cox put it best when he wrote: "My criticism of Roe v. Wade is that the Court failed to establish the
legitimacy of the decision by not articulating a precept of sufficient abstractness to lift the ruling above the level of a
political judgment .... A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113 (1976); see also
A. BIcKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONsENT 28 (1975) ("One is left to ask why. The Court never said. It refused the discipline
to which its function is properly subject."); Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J.
920, 936-37 (1973) ("At times the inferences the Court has drawn from the values the Constitution marks for special
protection have been controversial, even shaky, but never before has its sense of an obligation to draw one been so
obviously lacking."). See generally Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of the Legitimacy
of the Supreme Court Abortion Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 830-32.
25. See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (marriage by minors dis-
tinguished); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 623 n.6 (1979) (Stewart, J., concurring) (commitment of minors in mental
institutions distinguished).
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and pretend otherwise. Of course, the admission that the abortion cases are in-
consistent with established family law principles does not mean that the aberration of
the abortion doctrine might not be justified by special circumstances pertaining to the
unique abortion decisions,26 but that is another question.
Finally, Chapter Three includes cases dealing with no-fault divorce and its
effects on property, alimony, and support obligations.2 7 While the connection be-
tween these cases and the theme of equality is unclear, the case selection is excellent
and the comments are illuminating.
D. Reduction of State Involvement in Marriage
The theme of Chapter Four, styled "State Involvement in Marriage," is that in
recent years state regulation of marriage has declined. The authors explain:
Marriage becomes a matter of active legal concern chiefly when it is in trouble, breaking.
up, or terminated by death. Even then the primary interest appears to be to allocate and
distribute property rights, and the marriage itself is incidental to such disposition ....
Formal requirements to obtain a marriage license and the capacity to marry are ordinarily
of no serious legal import... unless years have passed and an action for annulment of
marriage is brought or the alleged invalidity of marriage is claimed to affect devolution of
property upon death. The state is interested in and regulates these proprietary issues, and
in so doing it regulates marriage.
... Moral considerations, of course, continue to be prevalent in personal relations,
but on a social and religious level rather than as a matter of governmental intervention.
28
The introductory comments to Chapter Four are superb. In this thought provok-
ing introduction the authors make two points. The first is that the definition and
regulation of marriage qua marriage is a secondary consideration "that comes up
incidentally in distribution and adjudication of rights to private property." 2 9 This
perspective "views marriage as essentially a prelude to potential issues of property" ;30
the definition and regulation of marriage are only incidental.
Second, consistent with their first point, the authors focus on what Mary Ann
Glendon calls "the new property." 3 1 Weyrauch and Katz note that "the focus of
proprietary concern is shifting to universal entitlements. In particular, the importance
of property distribution upon death is being slowly replaced by a growing list of
entitlements during life."'32 The authors perceive a conflict in the cases between the
conception of "new property" and the policy of minimizing tax expenditures. 33 They
26. But see L. WARDLE & M. WOOD, A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION 77-90 (1982).
27. Manning v. Manning, 237 Ga. 746, 229 S.E.2d 611 (1976), overruled, Dickson v. Dickson, 238 Ga. 672, 235
S.E.2d 479 (1977); In re Marriage of Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972). See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra
note 3, at 302-17.
28. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 350, 352.
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id. at 350.
31. M. GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY (1981). The term "the new property" refers generally
to "new forms of property, such as jobs or entitlements." Id. at 3.
32. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 351.
33. Id. at 380.
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suggest that "[t]he wall separating the well-off from the poor is crumbling" and that
concomitantly the previously existing dual system of family law---"the courts and
private law dealing with the rights of the reasonably affluent, on the one hand, and
the legislative and executive branches of government concerned with the duties of the
less fortunate, on the other"--is disappearing.34
As noted earlier, the primary theme of Chapter Four is that state interest in and
regulation of marriage is decreasing. In support of this thesis, the authors include
opinions in which courts have demonstrated greater flexibility in applying marriage
prohibitions and formality requirements.3 5 Interestingly, no cross reference is made
to the cases in Chapter Two dealing with common-law marriage. If state involvement
in the process of forming marriage were truly waning, an increase in the number of
states allowing common-law marriage or, at least, a relaxation of the requirements for
creating common-law marriages in those states that already allow them might be
expected. But such a trend has not developed.3 6 In fact, Professor Daube suggests
that the overall historic trend is in precisely the opposite direction.3 7
Cases designed to demonstrate what the authors describe as the "waning state
involvement in termination of marriage" 38 are also discussed in Chapter Four.
Although no-fault divorce cases would have demonstrated this point very well, the
authors included those cases in Chapter Three. Consequently, the cases in this chap-
ter deal with jurisdiction for divorce, 39 full faith and credit,40 and comity. 41 This is
one of the strongest and most worthwhile sections of the book; the case selection is
outstanding and the comments are excellent. Ironically, however, the impression
conveyed by the cases is not that state involvement in the termination of marriage is
waning, but that at least the procedural issues arising upon the termination of mar-
riage are as complicated and entangling as they have ever been.
E. Parent-Child Relationships
The final chapter of the book is entitled "Children: In or Out of Privity." The
authors' decision to limit their discussion of parent-child relations in family law to
one chapter and to put that chapter at the end of their book is consistent with their
34. Id. at 351.
35. Wilkins v. Zelichowski, 26 N.J. 370, 140 A.2d 65 (1958); Bilowit v. Dolitsky, 124 N.J. Super. 101,304 A.2d
774 (1973); F.A. Marriage License, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 1 (1955). See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at 353-65.
36. It has been more than eight years since a Florida Governor's Conference on Marriage and the Family Unit
recommended that "'common law marriage should be reinstated,"' Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including
Thoughts on the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 102 n.5 (1976) (citing Letter from Professor
Weyrauch to the author (Jan. 8, 1976)), yet no resurgence of common-law marriage recognition has occurred.
37. Daube, Historical Aspects of Informal Marriage, 25 REVUE INTERNATIONALE ons Dorrs DE L'ANTIQurrl 95
(1978).
38. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KAiz, supra note 3, at 434.
39. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Leader V. Leader, 73 Mich. App. 276, 251 N.W.2d 288 (1977). See W.
WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at 434-45.
40. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Williams v. North Carolina [II],
325 U.S. 226 (1945); Williams v. North Carolina (I], 317 U.S. 287 (1942); Wheat v. Wheat, 229 Ark. 842, 318 S.W.2d
793 (1958). See W. NVEYRAucH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 445-85.
41. Yoder V. Yoder, 31 Conn. Supp. 345, 330 A.2d 825 (1974); Hyde v. Hyde, 562 S.W.2d 194 (Tenn. 1978). See
W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at 485-94.
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business/property approach to family law. Also consistent are the introductory com-
ments, which note that the historical treatment of children in family law can be
explained from the perspective of property rights: children once were viewed as "the
future heirs" of the property of their parents and in relation to their parents "acquired
some of the characteristics of property, or chattels."'42 The authors admit that the role
of children is difficult to conceptualize clearly if marriage is viewed exclusively as a
matter of partnership or property. From that perspective, they note, children could be
viewed as assets, products, or consumers of the marriage43 to which might have
been added liabilities, limited partners, investors, shareholders, or employees.
The first two sections of this chapter are the most valuable, for in them are
discussed the very practical issues of custodial alternatives and factors influencing
custody decisions. 44 As in the preceding chapters, the authors emphasize practical
perspectives, and their astute observations demonstrate the thinking processes of two
very capable lawyers.45
The discussion of the policy conflicts in custody questions is very perceptive.
Two points stand out. First, the authors emphasize that a totally subjective, discre-
tionary "best interests of the child" standard for determining custody may not actually
be in the best interests of children. Instead, they argue that finality and family peace
are in the best interests of children and that the apparent subjectivity of the "best
interests of the child" standard may encourage perpetuation of conflict and turmoil.
4 6
This point is well made without being overdone; the authors acknowledge the failings
of the present standard but realize that the judgment and common sense of the trial
judge are indispensable ingredients in child custody determinations.
Second, the authors' realistic appraisal of joint custody is impressive.47 Simply
stated, joint custody is considered by many to be more beneficial to children of
divorced parents than other custody arrangements because it resembles, more closely
than any other child custody arrangement, the structure of predivorce family rela-
tions. It is the least dissolved of all postdissolution family structures. Children need
stable families, no less when their parents' marriage fails than when it succeeds. Yet
despite the advantages of joint custody, Weyrauch and Katz are not oblivious to its
potential disadvantages:
The ideal of joint custody of children after divorce, by comparison, appears to have a
utopian quality. It pretends, for purposes of child custody, that the marriage continues.
This unreality may be confusing to a child and indeed detrimental in that it prevents the
child from confronting the divorce and its effect on the once intact family unit. Further
complications arise when the child's parents remarry and form new relationships. ...
[Wihat may be psychologically desirable for children should not be confused with what in
fact takes place in child custody proceedings and what actually happens thereafter.
48
42. W. WEmRAucH & S. KAiz, supra note 3, at 495.
43. Id. at 497.
44. Id. at 498-564.
45. See, e.g., id. at 505-08, 514, 535, 550, 559-63.
46. Id. at 550.
47. See id. at 519-21.
48. Id. at 520-21.
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Overall, the authors present a balanced perspective on child custody that is un-
derstanding and sympathetic, yet practical and realistic.
Chapter Five also deals with the rights of children born outside of marriage.
4 9
This section accurately sketches the state of the law and the policy tensions inherent
in it. In addition, the authors' comments concerning the tragic difficulties that would
exist if all unwed fathers automatically had the power to block adoption proceedings
have been partially vindicated by the recent Supreme Court ruling in Lehr v.
Robertson.5
0
Another section, entitled "Children as Persons," reveals that the practice-
oriented approach is not without its shortcomings. Three cases5 ' and two pages of
commentary 52 do not even begin to address the provocative policy questions that are
implicated in any discussion of the rights of children vis-A-vis their parents or the
state. The authors' laudable emphasis on the street-level perspective of the practicing
family lawyer rather than the systemic perspective of the family law policymaker
does not justify the incomplete treatment accorded to this immensely important sub-
ject. Nor does it explain the singular policy viewpoint that is conveyed in the cases
selected by the authors. Two of the cases presented, Bellotti v. Baird53 and Phelps v.
Bing,54 make similar arguments and reach similar conclusions supporting the rights
of unemancipated minors to make extremely important decisions without parental
approval (and, in Bellotti, arguably without parental involvement). These cases
present the same policy perspective on a profound issue about which other important
perspectives are worth considering. Moreover, the issues, analysis, and conclusion of
the Phelps case duplicate Lavato v. Evans,55 which is included in Chapter Three.
56
The policy reflected in the brief glimpse of the children's rights issue in this
section is myopic. The prospect of "abandoning youth to their rights" is disquieting. 57
A few years ago Ferdinand Schoeman addressed some of these concerns:
We typically pay attention to the rights of individuals in order to stress their moral
independence .... In other words, the language of rights typically helps us to sharpen
our appreciation of the moral boundaries which separate people ....
Ideally the relationship between parent and infant involves an awareness of a kind of
union between people which is perhaps more suitably described in poetic-spiritual lan-
guage than in analytic moral terminology. We share our selves with those with whom we
are intimate and are aware that they do the same with us. Traditional moral boundaries,
which give rigid shape to the self, are transparent to this kind of sharing....
49. Id. at 582-618.
50. 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983).
51. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); White v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Phelps v.
Bing, 58 111. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974). See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at 564-80.
52. W. WEruRUCH & S. KArz, supra note 3, at 580-82.
53. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
54. 58 Ill. 2d 32, 316 N.E.2d 775 (1974).
55. 1 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA) 2848 (Utah Dist. Ct. 1975).
56. See W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at 383-86.
57. Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About Abandoning Youth to Their
"Rights." 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 605.
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The danger of talk about rights of children is that it may encourage people to think
that the proper relationship between themselves and their children is the abstract one that
the language of rights is forged to suit.
58
In other words, the risk of declaring the rights of children is that instead of encourag-
ing parents and children to focus upon the values of sharing, caring, and selflessness
(dare I say love?) that are the essence of, and give the greatest meaning to, the
relationship of parent and child, a children's rights approach focuses upon separate-
ness, rigidity, and quid pro quo. Rights are not what parent-child relations are about.
The authors' attempt to force the analytical framework of individual rights upon the
parent-child relationship may be like trying to force a square peg into a round hole.
But for lawyers, especially academic lawyers, this may be an error of habit. As Mark
Twain is reputed to have said, if the only tool you have is a hammer, all of your
problems will look like nails.
III. GENERAL CRITCISM
One general criticism of American Family Law in Transition is that, perhaps in
an attempt to keep the book to a moderate length (to avoid "being encyclopedic," as
they put it), 59 the authors left out some materials the inclusion of which would have
strengthened the book. The book seems incomplete in two respects: first, it does not
adequately address the practical noneconomic factors that are extremely important in
most family law disputes; and second, the theory or policy of family law is consid-
ered only haphazardly.
Although the practical economic considerations of family law are revealed with
clarity and insight,60 the significant noneconomic aspects of family law practice are
not. The economic facets of marriage are not the only, or even the most important,
aspects of the most troubled relationship in modem America. Even though it is
axiomatic that dealing with the emotional and social aspects of troubled family
relations may be far more important in achieving a successful resolution of a client's
family law problems, this book pays little attention to client interviews, client
counseling, client referral to other professionals, alternative means of dispute resolu-
tion such as mediation or conciliation, and similar topics. Similarly, professional
responsibility dilemmas, including dual client representation in divorce and the eth-
ical and practical considerations concerning the setting, securing, and collecting of
fees for legal services and the use of contingent fees were neglected. Inclusion of
materials dealing with these issues would have presented a more complete picture of
family law from the perspective of the practicing lawyer and trial judge. 6 1
58. Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Parents, and the Moral Basis of the Family, 91 Enncs 6, 8-9 (1980)
(emphasis in original).
59. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KATZ, supra note 3, at viii.
60. The tax and bankruptcy aspects of divorce are the only economic issues that should have been included but were
not.
61. Professor Katz has eloquently acknowledged these concerns elsewhere:
[W]e lawyers should feel a sense of obligation to assist our clients, whether male or female, in understanding the
enormous adjustment problems that they will face after divorce. We should view our responsibility as first trying
to help prevent marital-breakup. I do not make this suggestion naively. I know some marriages are "irretrievably
broken" by the time a lawyer is sought. But many, I am sure, are salvageable if lawyers will discuss on a
realistic plane all that divorce involves.
Katz, Humanizing the Divorce Process, FAm. ADVOC., Summer 1981, at 63.
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Also, a cogent presentation or discussion of the social policies and theories that
are the foundation for the rules and application of family law is omitted.6 2 Although
occasional comments are made about policy considerations, the book lacks a
systematic consideration of the theory or policy of family law. This omission is both
unfortunate and unnecessary. As Robert Gorman has noted, "the teaching of the
theoretical and practical is mutually reinforcing.
'
"
63
Weyrauch and Katz are not the only family law scholars to ignore the theory of
the law. Unquestionably, American family law is in need of a good theory today, and
few scholars have risen to the challenge. The best recent scholarship is by Bruce
Hafen. In an excellent article, Hafen articulates a cogent justification for extending
special, favorable treament in law to relationships of marriage, adoption, and kin-
ship, focusing on the purposes of a democratic society. Additionally, he undertakes
the Herculean task of reconciling the major Supreme Court family law decisions
under his theory with impressive success. 64 Another excellent theoretical discussion
is contained in James Fishkin's thoughtful monograph, Justice, Equal Opportunity,
and the Family.65 Fishkin describes what he calls the "trilemma" of American liberal-
ism in which society, although committed equally to the principles of merit, equal life
opportunity, and family autonomy, cannot achieve any two of these goals without
foreclosing the third. 66 Moreover, Professor Laurence Tribe, 67 his Harvard law
students, 68 and others6 9 have espoused a popular theory of family law that essentially
views the family as just another "private" association whose legal interests are simply
the interests of the individuals who make up the family.
70
Weyrauch and Katz make several references to a "new theory" of family law
71
and suggest in various places that the theory has something to do with "autonomy.
72
Individual autonomy, however, is not a "new theory."73 Furthermore, while au-
tonomy may be an important ingredient in any theory of family law, surely there is
more to it than that.7 4 In some contexts of family law, it is difficult to distinguish
protected individual autonomy from mandatory social apathy.75
Notwithstanding the absence of an articulated, cogent theory of social policy
regarding the family, American Family Law in Transition is a book of theoretical
significance for two reasons. First, although Weyrauch and Katz have not described
62. The authors mistakenly suggest that a comprehensive discussion of some matters would have "assume[d] a
closed intellectual system." W. WmReAucH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at viii.
63. Gorman, supra note 1, at 319; see also Cramton, supra note 2, at 331.
64. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-Balancing the Individual and
Social Interests, 81 MtcH. L. REV. 463 (1983).
65. J. FiSHKIN, JusTcE, EQUAL OpPORTuNrry, AND THE FAMILY (1983).
66. Id. at 4-5.
67. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUrTONAL LAW 882-84, 985-90 (1979).
68. Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156 (1980).
69. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
70. "[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and a heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup." Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
71. W. WEYRAUCH & S. KA-z, supra note 3, at vii, viii.
72. See, e.g., id. at viii, 1-4, 43, 225-28, 250-52, 350-53.
73. See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
74. For example, one might ask: How does individual autonomy relate to family autonomy and to family privacy?
What other values underlie our system of family laws?
75. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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or explained a new theory of family law, they have illustrated one. Second, the
authors contribute to legal pedagogy by teaching family law from the perspective of
the practicing lawyer.
The authors' theory of the predominant social policy in family law is a theory of
conflict resolution. Utilizing the best talents of experienced law teachers who are just
as concerned about developing their students' ability to analyze cases competently
and distill valid principles as they are with teaching their students those principles,
the authors' thesis is reflected in the cases they have selected and is suggested, rather
than stated, in their comments. Repeatedly, the authors allude to the idea that family
law is best understood as the law of conflict resolution. This theory downplays the
importance of social morality and other social policies. It implies that the courts,
especially at the trial level, are less interested in social engineering-enforcing ab-
stract theories of social good through state regulation of family relationships-than
they are in securing peace, stability, order, predictability, and the protection of
reasonable expectations within the family.
This "theory of family law from legal practice"7 6 is a refreshing, undogmatic
perspective. The "transition" that the authors see, at least at the trial level, is a
movement away from absolutism of legal principle toward flexibility, a movement
away from approaching and deciding cases with the goal of preserving intact the
theory of the law toward approaching and deciding cases with the goal of resolving
the disputes.
Perhaps the courts have not really been changing very much, however. The
authors discovered their flexible approach when they looked at family law issues
from the perspective of the practicing lawyer and the trial court. Practicing lawyers
and trial courts probably have always been more interested in the pragmatic con-
sequences of applying the law in particular cases than in preserving the pristine
inviolability of the theory of the law. After all, no-fault divorce was a reality in most
states long before legislation was enacted.
Even if they don't establish that the courts are moving toward a more flexible,
pragmatic approach, Weyrauch and Katz make an important theoretical contribution
to legal pedagogy by teaching family law from the perspective of the practicing
lawyer. Perhaps in no other law school course has the traditional emphasis on teach-
ing legal doctrines been as inappropriate as in courses on family law, which are
unavoidably local in both substance and procedure. The traditional case method
approach, emphasizing doctrinal trends in appellate court opinions, has graded and
graduated generations of law students on the basis of knowledge about rules that have
virtually no value outside of the jurisdiction in which they were rendered and that are
often of only peripheral significance to the practice of family law anywhere. Students
hav completed law school ill-equipped to enter into the very pragmatic practice of
family law and largely ignorant of the overarching theories of social policy that
provide the intellectual context in which family law doctrines have developed. By
76. W. WFIRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 3, at vii.
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emphasizing in their course book the practical perspective of practicing lawyers and
trial judges, Weyrauch and Katz have made a major contribution to the theory of
teaching family law.
Finally, concerning their thesis of "transition" in the law, 77 Weyrauch and Katz
point out that social, economic, and political conditions have changed a great deal in
recent years. No one would deny that. Further, they frequently note that legal rules
are in a state of transition. Undoubtedly this is also true. Based on these findings the
authors dutifully suggest that the theories undergirding the traditions of family law
are inadequate. (I say "dutifully" because nearly everyone who writes about family
law feels obliged to ritually kick the trainer while mounting the horse.) The changes
in legal perspective, practice, and doctrine that the authors have identified, however,
do not necessarily mean that the theory of the law needs to be modernized. Social
changes and evolution of legal doctrines do not necessarily indicate theoretical
obsolescence.
To understand why the claim of theoretical obsolescence is not necessarily valid,
four points must be appreciated. First, the law has at least three levels: the policy of
the law (law as theory); the doctrine of the law (law as written in statutes, regulations,
or judicial opinions); and the application of the law (law as actually applied). Second,
in some (many?) matters the law is not entirely consistent at all three levels. 78 Third,
the different ethical claims that can be made about legal principles, which explain the
relationship between the theory of the law and the law as written or the law as applied
must be distinguished. 79 Essentially, the ethical claims range from what might be
called inviolable (i.e., the claim that a principle must be preserved and effectuated at
all costs because it would be wrong to allow any exception to it) to what might be
called advisory (i.e., the claim that a principle is worth considering but is not worth
enforcing through the compulsory instrumentalities of government). Fourth, the rea-
son why the law is not consistent at every level is that the appropriate relationship
between the theory of the law and the law as written may be different than the
appropriate relationship between the theory of the law and the law as applied. One
may logically conclude that it is more important to have the law as written clearly
articulate some legal principles (e.g., symbolic values) than it is to have them ap-
plied; while concerning other principles (e.g., customary practices), one may con-
clude that it is not as important that they be specifically articulated as it is that they be
applied.
Thus, to discover that the law as applied differs from the law as written does not
necessarily mean that the theory of the law is changing or is inadequate. That the
relationship between the theory of the law and the law as applied is not inviolable
does not mean that the theory of the law is defective.
77. American Family Law in Transition is not as much about the law in transition as it is about changing the
perspective from which we-i.e., family law teachers and students-view the law.
78. 1. COHEN, R. ROBSON & A. BATES, PARENTAL Autorry: THE COMMUNrry AND THE LAW 195, 198 (1958)
(notes a large variance between the law as written and community moral sense).
79. See generally J. FisrgiN, supra note 65, at 170-77.
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IV. CONCLUSION
American Family Law in Transition makes a valuable contribution to family law
theory and pedagogy by focusing attention on the practical economic concerns and
perspectives of the practicing lawyer. Weyrauch and Katz have very capably demon-
strated that the perspectives of the practicing lawyer and trial court can be taught
successfully within the framework of an introductory family law course. They have
shown that teaching family law students about the practical considerations and actual
consequences of the law as applied can be a stimulating intellectual exercise.
Moreover, the casebook illustrates an important theory of conflict resolution in fam-
ily law. Last, the work is a commendably manageable 618 pages of opinions and
commentary. Thus, on balance, American Family Law In Transition makes an impor-
tant and welcome contribution to family law literature.
